Bernard S. BACHRACH
Grand Strategy in the Germanie Kingdoms : Recrutement of the Rank and File
The grand strategy of a government, both for offense and defense, is sustained by manyfold mili¬ tary policies, but some of the most important ones concern the participation in the armed forces. It would seem that throughout the history of the Middle Ages, almost any conceivable policy was tried. Some governments relied primarily on free male citizens, while others made substantial use of the non free and slaves. In some societies, the poor bore the brunt of military service, and yet in others the well off appeared to have played the central role (1).
In this study I will examine the recruitment of armed forces in the successor states of the later Roman empire in the West to ca. 700. An effort will be made to establish who was required to perform military service, with a special focus on the rank and file. The recruitment of men for specialized types of service, such as military households and garrisons, will not be treated.
In an important text for the history of the later Roman empire and the early Middle Ages, Eugip-pius (died ca. 533), abbot of the monastery of Castellum Lucullanum near Naples, observed : «while the Roman empire stood, milites were main¬ tained with publica stipendia in many fortified population centers (oppida) for the defense of the frontier (pro custodia limitis ), but when this consue-tudo lapsed, the military units (militares turmae ) and the limes were abolished together ». Eugippius’ statement permits the inference that sometime during the third quarter of the fifth century, perhaps as late as 487, the imperial government decided that it could no longer pay its troops in Noricum. It stopped providing the necessary stipendia and the¬ reby disbanded a portion of the army (2).
Eugippius goes on to relate, however, that «the troops stationed at Batava remained at their posts and sent a detachment to Italy in order to obtain the stipendia » (3). Thus the Roman units in Nori¬ cum were not officially informed of their disband¬ ment, and the men were actually very much inter¬ ested in continuing in Roman military service. Throughout the history of the later empire, it was not uncommon for troops to remain unpaid for lengthy periods of time. Yet in such cases, the soldiers sooner or later received at least some of their pay and allowances (4). For Eugippius, howe¬ ver, the lack of public payment signified the end of the imperial army as an institution. His statement
suggests that the imperial government never again provided the publica stipendia for the soldiers in Noricum, and he was in a position to have such information.
In some areas a small imperial presence may have persisted (5). In addition, Justinian’s efforts at reconquest reestablished significant numbers of imperial troops in many parts of the West through the end of the period treated here. Such units stationed across the frontiers from many of Rome’s successor states must have provided models of the imperial military organization and technology. However, what happened in Noricum very likely took place, at one time or another, throughout the greater part of the Roman empire in the West. In this study we will try to ascertain the fate of those men who were under arms as imperial soldiers one day, and not so employed on the next. First, however, we should gain some idea as to their number.
The regular army in the West, comprised of comitatenses and limitanei, numbered «on paper » approximately a quarter of a million men and perhaps even more (6). But we should not overlook the veterans either, who throughout the history of the empire were accorded considerable military importance (7). A rather mechanistic calculation suggests that a regular force of some 250,000 men equally distributed through twenty year enlistments would retire 12,500 men per year. We know that whole classes of recruits were required to enlist as early as sixteen years of age, but if we assume that each man entered the service at the age of twenty and retired after twenty years of service, the pool of able-bodied veterans in the West between the ages of forty and fifty-five would be at any time well in excess of 180,000 men (8). This model takes into consideration the death or disabling of several thou¬ sand veterans, as well as early enlistments and late retirements. The fifty-five upper limit in terms of viable military service should not appear too high ; during the Middle Ages, men were oftén expected to serve into their sixties and even to seventy years of age (9).
It would be foolish to insist upon an optimal figure approaching 500,000 comitatenses, limitanei and able-bodied veterans available for service a mere two decades before Aetius’ imperial regulars, supported by Visigotic and Alan federates, defeated Attila’s horde in the field at Chalon in 451 (10). Even a dramatic down-scaling of the total to
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